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ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF
STATE CONVICTIONS
B Y ITS RECENT decision in Jackson v. Virginia,' the Supreme Court has
overturned precedent in holding that "in a challenge to a state criminal
conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . . . the applicant is entitled
to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced
at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt."' The new standard, which the majority de-
clared to be compelled by In re Winship,' sparked a spirited dissent and is
likely to refuel an already hot controversy over the limits of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction.4
The facts of the case were not complicated. It was undisputed at
the trial that the defendant, Jackson, had shot and killed the victim. How-
ever, he set out a somewhat improbable defense based upon claims of self-
defense or, in the alternative, intoxication so as to counter state allegations
of premeditation which would have made the crime first degree murder
under Virginia law.' This was rejected by the state trial judge who was
sitting as the finder of fact.' Jackson's appeal on the grounds of insufficient
evidence to support his conviction was denied by the Virginia Supreme Court,
thus affirming his thirty-year sentence and exhausting his state remedies.'
Accordingly, the arena shifted to the federal courts, where petitioner
raised the same claim. Both the United States District Court and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in unpublished decisions, applied the standard set
out in the case of Thompson v. City of Louisville,8 usually referred to as the
199 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
2 Id. at 2792.
3 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
4 For a good overview of the subject, see generally Note, Developments in the Law: Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038 (1970). Also, compare Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 441 (1963) with
Chisum, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 21 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 682
(1972).
5 A summation of the petitioner's contentions is provided by Justice Stewart:
When asked to describe his condition at the time of the shooting, he indicated that
he had not been drunk, but had been "pretty high." His story was that the victim
had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He said that he
had defended himself by firing a number of warning shots into the ground, and had
then reloaded his revolver. The victim, he said, then attempted to take the gun from
him, and the gun "went off" in the ensuing struggle. He said that he fled without
seeking help for the victim because he was afraid.
99 S. Ct. at 2785.
6 He declared himself "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt .. " Id.
TId. n.5.
8362 U.S. 199 (1960).
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"no evidence" rule.' However, while the District Court found no evidence, the
Court of Appeals found "some" and reversed the District Court, thus rein-
stating the conviction.1" The Supreme Court granted certiorari1 to clear up
the question of the effect of Winship on the Thompson no evidence rule."
In 1977, Justice Stewart first raised the issue in the case of Freeman
v. Zahradnick," in a dissent from a denial of certiorari:
On direct review of state court convictions, this Court reviews the
application of the "voluntariness" standard to the historical facts to
determine whether a confession was admissible, or the application of
First Amendment standards to the facts as found to determine whether
the conduct in issue was constitutionally protected, to take but two
examples. The same rule is applied to federal habeas corpus actions.
... It is not immediately apparent why application of the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of Winship to the historical facts should
be any more immune from constitutional scrutiny. If, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, . . a federal
court determines that no rational trier of fact could have found a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the state offense with
which he was charged, it is surely arguable that the court must hold,
under Winship, that the convicted defendant was denied due process
of law."
Now in Jackson, two years after the Zahradnick dissent, Justice Stewart
is speaking for the majority. 5 His logic is persuasive as he fleshes out the
argument originally set forth in the earlier case. He begins with the basic
Winship principle that "no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof - defined as evidence
necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the ex-
istence of every element of the offense."1 This constitutional right and its
protection are of sufficient importance to merit the abandonment of the
Thompson rule:
That the Thompson "no evidence" rule is simply inadequate to
protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of rea-
sonable doubt is readily apparent. "[A] mere modicum of evidence may
satisfy a 'no evidence' standard.. . ." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
9 See text accompanying note 87 infra.
99 S. Ct. at 2786.
"199 S. Ct. 609 (1979).
12 99 S. Ct. at 2786.
'3429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
'141d. at 1111-12.
15 Joining Justice Stewart in the majority opinion were Justices Marshall, Brennan, White,
and Blackmun. Like Stewart, Marshall and Brennan had dissented in the Zahradnick case,
finding no evidence under Thompson but also protesting "the Court's refusal to consider the
novel and important issue of constitutional law" raised by Justice Stewart. Id. at 1120.
16 99 S. Ct. at 2788.
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202, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 1686, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing). Any evidence that is relevant-that has any tendency to make
the existence of an element of a crime slightly more probable than
it would be without the evidence, cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 401-could be
deemed a "mere modicum." But it could not seriously be argued that
such a "modicum" of evidence could by itself rationally support a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The Thompson doctrine simply
fails to supply a workable or even a predictable standard for deter-
mining whether the due process command of Winship has been hon-
ored.'7
However, having boldly championed the need for the new standard
of review, the majority found the evidence sufficient to satisfy the new
"no rational trier of fact" standard, saying:
Under the standard established in this opinion as necessary to preserve
the due process protection recognized in Winship, a federal habeas
corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports con-
flicting inferences must presume--even if it does not affirmatively
appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts
in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution. 18
In a strong dissent,"9 Justice Stevens lays out three major areas of
disagreement with the majority opinion: 1) the standard adopted was not
necessary to the decision; 2) the result reached is "not logically compelled"
by Winship; 3) the new standard "threatens serious harm to the quality of
our judicial system.""0
This comment will attempt to demonstrate that the faults complained
of by the dissent are not substantial. On the contrary, the decision gives
much-needed interpretation to an important aspect of federal habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction. However, the practical consequences of the employment
of the Jackson standard are problematic.
I
The first fault the dissent finds with the majority position is that,
strictly speaking, the formulation of a new constitutional standard for federal
habeas corpus review of claims of evidentiary insufficiency in state con-
victions was not necessary for the outcome of the case.21 As we have seen,
since the Court found sufficient evidence to meet the new, stricter standard,
there would have been enough to satisfy the more lenient Thompson standard
as well. Justice Stevens accuses the majority of having "formulated a new
'71Id. at 2790.
I Id. at 2793.
19 The dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
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constitutional principle under the most dangerous possible circumstances-
i.e., where the exercise of judicial authority is neither necessitated nor cap-
able of being limited by . . . some broader set of identifiable experiences
with the evil supposedly involved. -2
In support of this contention, Justice Stevens cites the concurring
opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.3
In that case the majority, per Chief Justice Hughes, found the legislation
setting up the TVA constitutional even though this determination was not
necessary to the decision of the case. Justice Brandeis began by agreeing
with the "conclusion on the constitutional question announced by the Chief
Justice"" but felt that the Supreme Court tradition of avoiding decisions
on constitutional grounds unless absolutely necessary should be adhered
to. The opinion, lavishly supported by citations, sets out seven rules of
caution in order to avoid "passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon [the Court] for decision." 5 These included, inter
alia, the rules that "[t]he Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it' " and "[tihe Court will not
'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the pre-
cise facts to which it is to be applied.' "26
However, this classic procedure has not been invariably followed, as
the existence of the Brandeis concurring opinion demonstrates. 7 In addi-
tion, if we are to be scrupulous in limiting the use of judicial principles to
the context in which they originated, Brandeis was concerned about aband-
oning established practice when passing upon the constitutionality vel non
of an act of Congress. One can readily understand the need for greater
caution in that context, so as to avoid tipping the federal balance of pow-
ers in assuming too large a role in overseeing the acts of the branch of
government constitutionally entrusted with the power to pass laws for the
good of the people. These considerations are not as important in the dis-
carding of the "no evidence" rule. Stare decisis has been traditionally rele-
gated to a lesser role in constitutional litigation, where a constitutional
principle is said never to be decided finally until it is decided correctly."8
22 Id. at 2794.
2297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 341.
25 Id. at 346.
26 Id. at 346-47. Both of these rules were culled from the case of Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S.
Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33 (1885).
27 For other examples, see generally L. LuSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? ch. 15 (1975).
28 See Justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 94 (1936), wherein he stated: "The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate
and even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the field of constitutional law.
See the cases collected by Brandeis, J., dissenting in Burnett v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 407, 408; 52 S. Ct. 443, 76 L. Ed. 815." See generally RHODE & SPAETH,
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING at 35-39 (1976).
[Vol. 13:4
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As to the argument that this was not the proper case in which to
change the standard, it can be argued in reply that since the announced
change of standard would not affect the outcome of any case where the
evidence was either non-existent (thus compelling a reversal under either
standard) or sufficient to comply with either standard (as in the Jackson
decision), only a case in the difficult-to-define area in between could support
the announcement of the new standard. However, the circuits were too
badly in need of guidance to wait for that event." Opposition to the new
test must stand on firmer constitutional ground than that of mere deviation
from traditional, but discretionary, practice.
11
Justice Stevens then contends that Winship and Thompson are not in-
consistent. He portrays Winship as setting a standard for trial and Thompson
one for appellate review.3" He distinguishes the cases further by showing
that "in Winship, the Court pointed out the breadth of both the historical
and the current acceptance of the reasonable-doubt trial standard. In this
case, by contrast, the Court candidly recognizes that the federal courts of
appeals have 'generally' rejected the habeas standard that it adopts today." 1
His final argument is the existence of two post-Winship Supreme Court cases
which rely on the Thompson standard, Vachon v. New Hampshire,2 and
Douglas v. Buder.2
The question of trial versus appellate standards relates to what might
be termed the central issue of the case, namely, whether the Winship stand-
ard is important enough to merit the federal invasion of the findings of
state finders-of-fact. A consideration of this matter is best left until after
an overview of the development of federal habeas corpus powers.3'
The reason for the federal courts' general rejection of the standard
announced in Jackson was the fact that a different, Supreme Court-mandated
standard (Thompson) already existed, whereas there was no such controll-
ing standard before Winship. If the Court must wait until legal principles
are as well-established as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Win-
ship was before giving them formal recognition, it will rarely, if ever, set
down or change a constitutional standard, and this would be an abdication of
its role as high court of the nation.
29 Compare the differing interpretations of the "no evidence" rule in Speigner v. Jago, 603
F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1979) and Wilson v. Parratt, 540 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1976), and note
how both differ from the rule as set out in Jackson.
30 99 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
s1 Id. at 2796.
32 414 U.S. 478 (1974).
s3412 U.S. 430 (1973).
34 See notes 50-82 and accompanying text intra.
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Finally, an examination of the two cases cited by Justice Stevens re-
veals that in both of them the claim of evidentiary insufficiency was upheld.
Buder was simply a short per curiam opinion which applied the Thompson
standard and found no evidence in a case where none was to be found.
However, the Vachon court found no evidence to support the state con-
viction of a man for the sale of an obscene button to a minor, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it was undisputed on the record that the defendant owned
and operated the store at which the button was bought. Thus, the Vachon
decision, while purporting to apply the no evidence test, could be inter-
preted as requiring an evaluation of the evidence. This was, in fact, the
way it was read by the Sixth Circuit, which cited it in support of its state-
ment in Speigner v. Jago" that "after Winship, the term 'no evidence' must
be interpreted to include some notion of degree or weight of the evidence.""6
We must go beyond the Stevens characterization of Winship as "merely
extend[ing] to juveniles a protection that had traditionally been available
to defendants in criminal trials in this Nation." '37 Obviously, Winship must
be viewed as more than a juvenile court standard case. Analysis must start
with the principle set down in the Winship opinion by Justice Brennan:
"we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."3 Our focus
will be on more recent considerations of the Winship standard and its
meaning.
For the most part, the issue in post-Winship cases has been how the
use of certain procedures (especially jury instructions) related to the de-
fense's opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of
fact. The record in this area shows no overall consistency. Non-unanimous
jury verdicts,89 instructions involving a common law inference, " and a "pre-
sumption of truth" instruction as to prosecution witnesses' were held not
to hinder the defense's opportunity to raise the doubt sufficiently to create
due process implications; while an instruction to ignore defense testimony
unless it was believed true beyond a reasonable doubt,'2 the prevention of the
defendant's attorney from making a closing argument,"' and the trial of
an accused while wearing "prison garb"" were held to effectively deny
85 603 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1979).
58ld. at 1212.
87 99 S. Ct. at 2795.
38 397 U.S. at 364.
39 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
4 0 Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
41 Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
4 Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
4Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
4Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). However, in this case, the defendant was
held to have waived this right by not demanding a different set of clothing at the trial.
[Vol. 13:4
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the defense that opportunity. It was further held in Mullaney v. Wilbur"
that the Winship standard applied to every element of the crime. Attempts
to extend the Winship standard to proof of voluntariness of confessions'"
and the civil adjudication of obscenity'7 were both unsuccessful. There
has been no unanimity-virtually all the cases cited above were marked by
dissenting opinions.
However, the more the Court debates over applications or extensions
of the Winship standard, the more firmly established Justice Brennan's hold-
ing quoted above becomes. And as Justice Stewart points out in Jackson:
Congress in [28 U.S.C.] § 2254 has selected the federal district courts
as precisely the forums that are responsible for determining whether
state convictions have been secured in accord with federal constitutional
law. . . . The duty of a federal habeas corpus court to appraise a
claim that constitutional error did occur-reflecting . . . the belief
that . . . "finality" . . . is simply not to be achieved at the expense
of a constitutional right - is not one that can be so lightly abjured. "8
In this passage, Justice Stewart adheres to the expansive view of fed-
eral habeas power which is of comparatively modern origin.'" It is sig-
nificant that Justice Stevens does not take exception to it, but instead bases
his dissent on the grounds already noted.
We will return to this point after an examination of the history of
the writ of habeas corpus which will serve to highlight the particular
concerns raised by the invocation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoners.
I
The history of the "great writ""0 is itself a matter of some dispute. 1
However, it is clear that it had already been established in England both
in the common law and later by statute before 1700, thus becoming part
of the United States's inherited, common law tradition. After the Revolution
and the dissolution of the Articles of Confederation, habeas corpus was
45 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The holding of Mullaney may have been weakened by the decision
in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), allowing the states to make insanity an
affirmative defense, thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.
48 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), holding that proof of voluntariness of a con-
fession by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.
47 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 684 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
48 99 S. Ct. at 2791.
49 See text following note 71 infra.
50 As it was termed by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
51 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); compare Justice Brennan's majority opinion, id. at
402-14, with Justice Harlan's dissent, id. at 449-60. For a nonpartisan view, see Note, De-
velopments in the Law, supra note 4.
COMMENTSpring, 1980]
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made one of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution 2 and jurisdiction to
issue the writ was granted to the federal courts by the first session of Con-
gress in Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.11
After the legitimacy of this power was upheld," Chief Justice Marshall
set the standard for its proper exercise in Ex Parte Watkins.5 Marshall dis-
tinguished the prior cases on the ground that "[i]n no one of these cases was
the prisoner confined under the judgment of a court. 5 6 Therefore, Marshall's
view of the common law colored by federalist concerns was that:
[t]he judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, .... is
as conclusive on this court as it is on other courts.
... An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that
judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not... if the court has
general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous."
Most observers see this as setting up a standard by which habeas
corpus claims should be judged in order to determine whether or not to
entertain them. The use of this standard, coupled with the fact that Con-
gress had not yet granted to the federal courts the power to exercise habeas
corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners, severely curtailed the utility of the
writ. The situation changed somewhat after the Civil War, when the
Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 186711 was passed by Congress, containing the
following language: "the several courts of the United States... shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may
be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or any
treaty or law of the United States."6 This jurisdiction over state prison-
ers was withdrawn in 1868,61 only to be restored in 1885.2
52 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
5 3 Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
54See Ex parte Boilman and Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). The
writs were granted in all three cases.
55 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
56 Id. at 208.
5 7 1d. at 202-03.
5s Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), con-
sidered Watkins to be just another case establishing the power of the Court to issue the
writ. Id. at 407. This ignores the fact that it was the first major case to deny the writ to a
prisoner, and that it specifically denied the power of the Court to question the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction.
59Ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867).6O Id. (emphasis added). In Fay v. Noia, Justice Brennan cited the Congressional Globe for
the proposition that this act was intended to give the federal courts "all the powers that
can be conferred upon them" in order to enforce the new constitutional amendments. 372
U.S. at 415-17.
6 1 Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (1868). This compelled the decision in
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), wherein the repealing act was declared
constitutional and the appeal therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
62 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437 (1885).
[Vol. 13:4
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Throughout this period the Watkins standard remained unchanged, al-
though the interpretation of it was loosened somewhat with the analysis
espoused in Ex parte Siebold,63 that since an unconstitutional law "is void
and as no law, the conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is
illegal and void.""4 This enabled the Court to hold that a lower court
judgment based on such a law was not rendered by a court of "competent
jurisdiction," thus allowing habeas corpus to be granted."5
By the early 1900's, the jurisdictional standard was being stretched to
the limit. The cases of Frank v. Mangum"6 and Moore v. Dempsey67 serve
to illustrate this point. Both dealt with allegations by the respective peti-
tioners that their trials were so dominated by mob passion that they were
denied due process of law. Frank held that the jurisdiction inquired into
was not merely that of the trial court, but the whole state court system, in-
cluding its procedure for handling federal constitutional claims. However,
it was held that if the state had a proper scheme for consideration of con-
stitutional claims, federal review of those claims on habeas corpus was pre-
cluded. The Moore opinion did not even use the word "jurisdiction," but
spoke instead of determining whether or not "the whole proceeding is a
mask."68 If it was, then the federal habeas corpus court could "secure to
the petitioners their constitutional rights,"'6 even to the point of overturning
a judgment that was jurisdictionally valid.
The jurisdictional standard, although it continued to be used, 7 had been
effectively killed by Moore. It was finally buried in Waley v. Johnson,7 to
be replaced by a broader, more flexible test:
[T]he use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional
validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where
the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial
court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional cases where the
conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving
his rights."2
63 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
341d. at 376-77.
65 See Bator, supra note 4, at 473, where he contends that the lack of direct appeal for
federal prisoners was the major reason for what he calls the "softening" of the jurisdictional
standard.
66237 U.S. 309 (1915).
67 261 U.S. 86 (1922).
r8id. at 91.
69 Id. The majority in Fay v. Noia saw Moore as overruling Frank, but this is not univer-
sally accepted. See Bator, supra note 4, at 488-89.
70 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
72316 U.S. 101 (1942).
72/d. at 104-05. The Waley court cited Moore in support of its view.
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Thus, the new test was twofold: habeas corpus relief would be granted
upon a showing of unconstitutional conviction plus absolute need, i.e., no
other procedure in existence to protect the rights of the accused. Com-
pared to a literal interpretation of the jurisdictional test, the new standard
would seem to provide would-be petitioners with greatly increased access
to the federal habeas corpus system, especially after the Waley-Moore stand-
ard was extended to state prisoners in Ex Parte Hawk."
Yet the "modem" flood of habeas corpus claims was not touched off
until the case of Brown v. Allen." Both Justice Reed (for the Court) and
Justice Frankfurter (in an influential concurring opinion)" affirmed the
standard as set out above, then went further and read into the Habeas Cor-
pus Act"6 broad powers to, in effect, retry state adjudications without con-
sideration of the adequacy of state trial or review procedures.7" This case was
followed by Fay v. Noia" which, by sanctioning an expansive view of the
history of the exercise of habeas corpus power, converted the strong weapon
constructed by Brown v. Allen into one of nearly mystic significance."
Brown, Fay, and their Sixties progeny" had the effect of making the
writ a major conduit for protection of many of the "new" constitutional rights
that the Supreme Court incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment, as well as the prevention of police abuse under the
fourth amendment. 1 Although use of the writ to attack searches and
seizures has been curtailed somewhat by the decision in Stone v. Powell,82
Brown and Fay still define the applicable limits of the power of federal courts
to entertain the writ.
73321 U.S. 114 (1944).
But where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudica-
tion of the federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no remedy . . .
or because in the particular case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice
unavailable or seriously inadequate . . . a federal court should entertain his petitinn
for habeas corpus, else he should be remedyless.
Id. at 116.
T4 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
75 Id. at 488.
76 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967 (1948), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
77 Justice Reed emphasized the discretion of the federal court to hold the state proceedings
proper and thus leave their findings untouched, 344 U.S. at 463-64. In a separate opinion,
Justice Frankfurter presaged the expansive Fay view of the nature of the writ in safeguarding
constitutional rights, id. at 497-513.
78 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
79 Fay imbued the writ with so much power that it was not to be deterred by the presence
of an adequate state ground, e.g., the failure of the defendant to appeal to the state courts
within the required time. Id. at 472-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80 In particular, see Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) and Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Kaufman was later overruled by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1975).
81 See generally L. LusEy, supra note 27, at ch. 10.
82 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
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IV
Next, we will examine the Thompson line of cases to see the evolution of
the "no evidence" standard set out therein.
The facts of Thompson v. City of Louisville" brand the case as some-
what unusual." Stated simply, Thompson was arrested for loitering while
waiting for a bus in a Louisville bar, of which he was a regular patron.
When he objected to the arrest, he was charged with disorderly conduct.
The above facts (and a record showing fifty-four previous arrests) constituted
the sum total of the evidence presented by the city at Thompson's trial; yet
he was found guilty and fined ten dollars on each charge. Kentucky courts
could not review cases involving a penalty of less than twenty dollars per
charge, but because of the substantiality of the question presented and the
likelihood that it would be otherwise mooted,8" the Supreme Court in
effect took direct review from the Louisville Police Court."" The Court
overturned the conviction on the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency and
laid down the following standard to be used in the judging of future such
claims:
The ultimate question presented to us is whether the charges
against petitioner were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to
render his conviction unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Decision of this question turns not
on the sufficiency of the evidence, but upon whether this conviction
rests upon any evidence at all.8"
One is struck by the starkness of the phrase "any evidence at all."
At first blush, such a standard would seem to present a nearly insurmount-
able hurdle to those seeking to bring such a claim to the attention of the
Court. However, the Supreme Court's first major decision involving appli-
cation of the Thompson standard, Garner v. Louisiana,88 showed that the
standard was more capable of being met than its wording would seem
to indicate, This case, involving the convictions of participants in a lunch
counter sit-in on charges of disturbing the peace, reached the Supreme
Court in much the same manner as did the Thompson case. 9 After review-
ing the record, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, found "no
evidence" to support the convictions, despite the presence in the record of
93 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
84 See 62 W. VA. L. REv. 384 (1960); TIME, April 4, 1960, at 15.
85Thompson would have served time in jait at the rate of two dollars per day if he did
not pay the fine, and thus would have been released in ten days. 362 U.S. at 201.
88 This was done through an elaborate series of stays granted by the Police Court in Louis-
ville, the Kentucky Circuit Court, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Id. at 202.
87 Id. at 199.
88368 U.S. 157 (1961).
89 Id. at 159-61.
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the testimony of the lunch counter manager to the effect that he feared
"disturbances" if the protesters remained at the all-white counter."0 In
dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out that the interpretation of Thompson
used by the majority dramatically differed in effect from a literal "no evi-
dence" standard; the latter would preclude any review once evidence was
found,' whereas the evidence, once found, was tested for credibility by
the Garner majority. He went on to warn the Court as follows: "This case
[Thompson] is bound to lead us into treacherous territory, unless we apply
its teaching with utmost circumspection ....
The Court seemed to find Harlan persuasive, for in Edwards v. South
Carolina"3 it refused to entertain a Thompson "no evidence" claim in a case
involving a similar fact pattern to that of Garner, saying: "Whatever the
merits of this contention [insufficiency of the evidence] we need not pass
upon it in the present case. The state courts have held that petitioners'
conduct constituted breach of the peace under state law and we may
accept their decision as binding upon us to that extent."
This slight withdrawal from the Garner position paved the way for its
complete abandonment in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham," where it
was stated that "[tihe proposition for which [Thompson] stands is simple and
clear. It has nothing to do with concepts relating to the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence in any particular case."9"
The author of the Shuttlesworth opinion was Justice Stewart, and it is
his literal interpretation of the words "no evidence" which has been followed
by the lower federal courts ever since. Perhaps he knew best how truly
incompatible the idea of guaranteeing the Winship right through federal
habeas corpus was with the literal application of the Thompson stand-
ard, which dictated that once a "modicum" of evidence was discerned
in the record (assuming that the "reasonable doubt" instruction had been
given)," the reviewing court could not entertain claims of insufficiency of
the evidence. Of course we have seen how in Vachon, the Court weighed
the evidence, found it insufficient, and avoided Thompson by labeling the
inadequate evidence as "no evidence."9 " Thus, without the Jackson opinion,
90 Warren's reply: "his fear is completely unsubstantiated by the record." Id. at 171.
91 The manager's testimony was relevant. Therefore under a true "no evidence" standard,
its weight or persuasiveness should not have mattered.
92 368 U.S. at 190.
93 372 U.S. 229 (1962).
94 Id. at 235.
95 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
96 Id. at 94.
97 "[Sbo long as the reasonable doubt instruction has been given at trial, the no-evidence
doctrine . .. remains the appropriate guide . . . to apply. . . ." 99 S. Ct. at 2788 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Of course, this will no longer be true after Jackson.
98See text following note 34 supra.
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the Thompson standard would likely have gone the way of the old jurisdic-
tional standard, with only lip service being paid to its strictures.
V
An important point remains to be made: the above cases were all
brought to the Supreme Court on direct review. The Thompson standard
for reviewing the findings of the state trier of facts, as originally formulated,
was intended to apply in all federal appellate review of state court decisions;
it was not set out as being merely a standard of habeas corpus review.
However, the sole opportunity for the lower federal courts to make use
of the standard is in that setting. It is remotely possible, since the Jackson
decision was limited to habeas corpus review and since, as we have seen,
the writ of habeas corpus holds a unique position in American jurisprud-
ence,9 that the new standard will not be applied by the Supreme Court
on cases of direct review. However, this seems unlikely; the analysis in
Jackson can be applied with equal force to direct review situations.
So, the important effect of the overruling of the Thompson standard
will be upon the exercise of the habeas corpus power by the lower federal
courts. The question now to be considered is how much of an effect the
changing of the standard will have on habeas corpus cases, and what that
effect will be. The majority states that "the burden that is likely to follow
from acceptance of the Winship standard has, we think, been exaggerated.""1 *
The dissent responds:
It is true that in practice there may be little or no difference between
a record that does not contain at least some evidence tending to prove
every element of an offense and a record containing so little evidence
that no rational factfinder could be persuaded of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.... But this only means that the new rule will seldom,
if ever, provide a convicted state prisoner with any tangible benefits.
It does not mean that the rule will have no impact on the administration
of justice. On the contrary, I am persuaded that it will be seriously harm-
ful both to the State and Federal Judiciaries. 0 1
Of course, this is the prelude to a "floodgates" argument. This type
of objection has been part of every dissent from every extension of federal
habeas corpus power from Justice Jackson's in Brown v. Allen"0 2 to Justice
Stevens's in Jackson.' Well-intentioned though these arguments may be,
there is something fundamentally wrong with the knowing denial of ad-
mittedly important rights because of the inadequacy of the judicial system
99See notes 50-82 and accompanying text supra.
100 99 S. Ct. at 2791.
101 Id. at 2798.
102 344 U.S. at 532.
103 99 S. Ct. at 2793.
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to handle the caseload. Once a right is recognized and given constitutional
stature, its protection should be of paramount importance. If the system
cannot keep pace, then it must be either improved or its capacity enlarged.
If this cannot be done, then other, less important aspects of federal court
jurisdiction should be curtailed.'
An interesting question is what effect the Jackson standard might have
on the doctrine of Stone v. Powell,"0 5 which held that "where the State
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amend-
ment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure
was introduced at trial."'1
In the text of the Jackson opinion, Justice Stewart notes:
In sum, counsel for the State urges that this type of constitutional
claim should be deemed to fall within the limit on federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, identified in Stone v. Powell ... with respect to
Fourth Amendment claims. We disagree.
The constitutional issue presented in this case is far different
from the kind of issue that was the subject of the Court's decision in
Stone v. Powell ..... The question whether a defendant has been con-
victed upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of
guilt or innocence.'
So, the two cases are seen as consistent by the majority. The effect of Jackson
on Powell is therefore likely to be little or none; the watchword is still any
constitutional claim that is "central to the basic question of guilt or inno-
cence."
A more interesting question is why Powell did not have more of an
effect on Jackson? After Powell, observers were portending a dim future
for federal habeas corpus. After all, the Powell majority had adopted the
restrictive view of the history of habeas corpus put forth by the dissenters
104 Consider the following argument:
The much-heralded "flood" of writ petitions and the resulting "burden" on the federal
courts have been greatly exaggerated ...
... Of the 8281 prisoner petitions terminated by court action in fiscal 1970, 95.1% were
terminated before trial ....
More fundamentally, the very premise of any argument that federal judges are
too burdened by prisoner petitions should be challenged. The premise is that they
would be better spending their time on something else. Critics of habeas corpus
rarely ask whether there are other aspects of federal court jurisdiction that could be
more appropriately eliminated in order to ease federal court congestion. One con-
spicuous category is that of state law personal injury actions; filed under the diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction. In fiscal 1970, 13,794 of these actions were filed....
Chisum, supra note 4, at 698-99.
105 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
2
06 Id. at 494.
107 99 S. Ct. at 2790-92.
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in Fay,' and cries for further curtailment of the use of the writ were
plentiful."0 9 Yet, although it gave an approving cite to Powell, the Jackson
Court reaffirmed the expansive interpretation of the habeas corpus statute.
Perhaps the Powell decision will presage the abandonment of the exclusion-
ary rule, rather than a greater erosion of federal habeas corpus power.
What of the practical effects of the new standard? How will it be
administered? Let us examine the amount of evidence deemed sufficient
to support a finding of competence on the part of the defendant (as op-
posed to insanity) under the various standards we have examined. First,
Brooks v. Rose,"' a Sixth Circuit decision applying the Thompson standard.
In this case, the defense produced four experts who testified that the de-
fendant was rendered temporarily insane due to a head injury. The state
did not directly counter this, but relied upon the testimony of the witnesses
to the murder as to the defendant's behavior during the killings. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty, and this was affirmed by the federal appeals
court, Judge Weick saying that "the jury was not bound to accept the
psychiatrists' testimony, and could disregard it.""' Thus there was sufficient
evidence in the record to support possible inferences of sanity by the jury
when reviewed under a "no evidence" standard (i.e., where any evidence
at all is sufficient to support a verdict).
This case was explicitly overruled by the previously mentioned Speigner
v. Jago"' (over the vehement dissent of Judge Weick), which equated "no
evidence" with "some notion of degree or weight of the evidence.""' Thus,
the Speigner majority not only changed the way the Sixth Circuit inter-
preted the words "no evidence," but it implicitly changed the amount of
evidence needed to support a finding of mental competence as well. It
seems safe to say that under Speigner (which predated Jackson) more evi-
dence was needed than was presented in Brooks.
Finally, notice Moore v. Duckworth,"' a post-Jackson Supreme Court
case in which lay testimony was found fully "sufficient to support a jury
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was sane at the time
of the killing."" 5 Obviously there is no direct connection between these
cases, but they serve to illustrate the differing standards of review.
108 428 U.S. 474-78.
10 See Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas
Corpus Be Eliminated? 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740 (1972); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrevelant?
Collateral Attack and Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970). But see the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone, 428 U.S. 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 520 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975).
'M1 Id. at 780.
212 603 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
11s 603 F.2d at 1212.
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There will surely be no difference in the actual outcome of most cases.
Where the federal courts had formerly dismissed claims of evidentiary
insufficiency because of Thompson, they will now consider them - only
to find the great majority to be unfounded. A case in point is Davis v. Camp-
bell."' After noting the Jackson decision and its effect on the consideration
of claims of evidentiary insufficiency, the Eighth Circuit looked to the
record, found two doctors testifying for competency and two for insanity,
and found this to be sufficient evidence to satisfy the Jackson standard. In
practice, then, it is doubtful whether there will be any significant change in
reversal trends.117
It seems that the bottom line of the Jackson decision is that, while it
was necessary in order to make it clear to the federal courts that the Winship
standard applies to habeas corpus claims, the dissent has a point after all
- it will not be until the first conviction is overturned under the Jackson
standard that we will really have a clear idea of what constitutes evidence
from which no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
DAviD R. PARKER
-1 608 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979).
117 However, the Davis court did state that prior to Jackson, it was simply rejecting all
claims of evidentiary insufficiency on the authority of Thompson. Id. at 319 n.5.
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